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INTRODUCTION 
This note is part of a continuing work to improve the applicability of the 
human malfunction mechanism classification to event reports on one side 
and on the other side to identify the needs for supplementary information in 
event reports. 
All the examples except one are from: 
Nuclear Power Experience, Vol.  PWR-2, XVI Operational Problems, C Mis-
cellaneous.  Edited by Nuclear Power Experience Inc., P.O. Box 544, Encino, 
California, U.S.A. The November 1975 state of the compilation was used. 
One example under 13.1.3 is from: 
Rasmussen, J. (1978), "Notes on Human Error Analysis and Prediction".  
Riso-M-2139.  Riso 1978. 
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13. MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION 
13.1 Discrimination 
This group is related to the man's ability to discriminate between and se-
lect the proper mode of control of his activities.  The subcategories of mal-
function mechanisms are characterized by interference between the man's 
repertoire of stereotyped habitual - and often subconscious - responses on 
one side and on the other side aspects of the actual work situation during 
infrequent and unique task demands. 
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13.1.1 Stereotype (skill) fixation, Definition:  
Man operates in skill-based domain.  He does not recognize a situation 
calling for attention and caution. 
 (Cues for recognition may not be present or may be overlooked, this is 
characterised by category 12: Cause of human malfunction, or 11: Internal 
human malfunction). 
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13.1.1 Stereotype (skill) fixation, Examples: 
 
220. RECORDING ERROR - OVEREXPOSURE  
Robinson 2 - May 75 - cold shutdown 
The error in recording exposures occurred on May 6 
when the Teledyne TLD badge of the individual in ques-
tion was sent for routine processing.  When the results 
were sent to the exposure record area, the H.P. Techni-
cian in charge of posting doses mistakenly recorded the 
exposure of 721 mrem for the employee on the exposure 
sheet of another employee with a similar name.  The ex-
posure was uniquely identified by a number assigned to 
the individual, but the person posting the exposure relied 
on the person's name rather than cross checking the 
number.  The names of the 2 people involved were both 
listed with the same first initial and last name. 
Identifying people by names is a stereotype skill which is ambiguous and 
in this specific task should be replaced by the numbers. 
 
69. BORIC ACID VALVE MALFUNCTION - OPER.ATOR FEVER USED AS 
STEPPING POINT 
Palisades - Aug 73 
The valve location is such that it was Suspected that 
the valve (hence, the lever) may have been used as a con-
venient stepping point during construction and early op-
eration of the plant.  
The people using the valve as a stepping point are assumed to have been 
occupied by skill-based tasks not involving knowledge of valves and their 
properties. 
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13.1.2 Familiar association short-cut, Definition:  
It is recognized, that conscious identification of the situation is needed but 
familiar cues activate incorrect intention and task in man.  It is not recog-
nized that knowledge-based evaluation and planning is needed. 
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13.1.2 Familiar association short-cut, Examples: 
 
133. LIFTED LEADS NOT LOGGED - BOTH DIESEL FUEL FLOW PATHS 
OUT 
Surry 2 - Sept 74 - cold shutdown 
The valves were removed, repaired, and re-installed. 
The responsibility for re-connecting the valves was then 
given to a different group of electricians. The solenoids 
were re-connected at the valves themselves, but not iii 
the terminal boxes.  Flow path operability was errone-
ously verified by an operator and an electrician by ener-
gizing each fuel oil transfer pump, one at a time, and lis-
tening for solenoid valve operation.  Based on information 
provided to him, the Shift Supervisor noted in his log that 
2 flow paths had been re-established. 
The men expected to hear the sound of operating solenoid valves and 
hence they erroneously perceived the sound in spite of its definite absence. 
 
189. EXCESSIVE CONTROL ROD MISALIGNMENT - FAILURE TO 
PROMPTLY INVESTIGATE CAUSE. 
Three Mi. Is. 1 - Feb 75 - 100% power 
Due to occasional past problems with inaccurate abso-
lute position indications, the operators concluded this 
indication was in error and the absolute position bypass 
switch was placed in the bypass position (defeating the 
automatic alarm, out motion inhibiting and runback 
functions for this rod). 
 
206. ALARM INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED - LOW TANK LEVEL 
Oconee 2 - Mar -5 - 100% power 
Immediately prior to this incident, the alarm next to 
the quench tank low level alarm had been intermittently 
alarming.  The operator heard the audio portion of the 
alarm, looked up, and mistakenly thought this alarm was 
the intermittent  alarm again.  
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 13.1.3 Stereotype take-over, Definition:  
Task or act according to proper intention, but "absentmindedness" during 
performance leads to relapse to stereotype action links related to different act 
or task.  
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13.1.3 Stereotype take-over, Examples: 
 
134 INTERNAL CONTAMINATION FROM OPENING VACUUM 
CLEANER 
Robinson 2 - June 74 
Following plugging of steel generators, cleanup of the channel 
heads was begun.  A contractor employee was supervising the ef-
fort.  In his desire to speed the job up, he decided to directly aid in 
the work. 
After properly dressing for work In the steam generators, but 
prior to obtaining his respirator, the man checked the vacuum 
cleaner and found It to be inoperable.  He opened the vacuum 
cleaner to attempt to repair it.  Although the individual was very 
well-trained and experienced from many years of work with nuclear 
systems, he failed to consider possible radiological hazards when 
opening the vacuum cleaner which was clearly marked as being 
contaminated. 
The actual situation as a whole: directly aiding the cleanup work, was not 
a routine, as the man's job was to supervise the cleanup work.  However, to 
check and open the vacuum cleaner was a familiar routine to him.  Instead 
of properly finishing protection of himself against contaminated dust by put-
ting on his respirator, he starts checking and opening the vacuum cleaner. 
A different classification, Forgetting isolated act (13.3.1), is possible: 
The putting on of his respirator is an isolated act relative to the functional 
act of checking and opening the vacuum cleaner. 
Case:
During normal operation of a process plant the power supply. to 
the instrumentation and the control console slowly disappears. 
Investigation:
The manual main circuit breaker in the flywheel motor-generator supply is 
found to be in the off position.  The conclusion of an investigation was that a 
roving operator, checking cooling towers and pumps, inadvertently had 
switched from a routine check round to the Friday afternoon shut down 
check round and turned off the supply. 
The routes of the two check rounds are the same, except that-he is sup-
posed to pass by the door of the generator room on the routine check, but to 
enter and turn off the supply on the shut down check.  Something "en route" 
obviously has conditioned him for shut down check (sunshine and day 
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dreams?).  The operator was not aware of his action, but did not reject the 
condition. 
Comments:
Human operators move around in the plant, and it can be difficult to pre-
dict where in the causal structure of the plant he interferes.  His actions may 
not be initiated by an event in the system or specified by a program, but by 
subconscious mechanisms, i.e. it is difficult to predict when he interferes 
and how. 
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13.2 communication 
The two subcategories 13.2.1 and 13.2.2 are related to the man's activities 
in obtaining information. 
So far, no mental malfunction mechanisms are included related to the 
man's communication directed outwards. 
That an outwards communication malfunction has occurred, is classified 
under: 
11: Internal human 'Malfunction 
Erroneous function in action 
Communication given incorrectly 
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13.2.1 Communication not received/sought, Definition:  
Cues do not activate man because sensitivity/attention is insufficient for 
present information level. 
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13.2.1 -Communication not received/sought, Examples: 
 
84. TECHNICIAN ERROR - RPS SETPOINTS WRONG  
Ft. Calhoun - Dec (power escalation testing. The technician did 
not recognize that the set points were in violation of Tech Specs. 
 
146. OPERATOR DID NOT CHECK SIGHTGLASS - RELEASE 
Oconee 1 - Aug 74 - 100%. power 
The procedure to drain accumulated moisture from the Waste 
Gas Decay Tank has a caution note to shut the drain valves as 
soon as water is clear of the sight glass. The operator failed to 
realize that the sight glass-was free of liquid, however, and this 
resulted in venting the Waste Gas Decay Tank to the High Activ-
ity Waste Tank. 
 
178. PERSONNEL AND PROCEDURAL ERRORS - SAFETY 
INJECTIONS 
Zion 1 & 2 - Aug, Oct 
The testing included actuation of relay SIX-5A, which actuates a 
number of valves including the failed SI valve.  Upon completion 
of the test, the valve remained open instead of returning to the 
closed position when manually actuated from the control room.  
This went unnoticed by the operators at the control board. 
 
197. OPERATOR ERROR - RELEASE. 
Surry I - Mar 75 - 100% power 
An uncontrolled and unplanned release of low level radioactive 
material was  made to the discharge canal when an operator er-
ror caused a primary grade water tank to overflow for  2 hr. 
 
247. EMERGENCY POWER BATTERIES UNAVAILABLE FOR 
SERVICE- OPERATOR ERROR 
Oconee 2 - Julv -5 - 100% power 
During the process of planning the startup of unit 1 (Units 2 and 
3 at full power), it was discovered that 1 string of Keowee (emer-
gency power station! battery and 1 string of switching station 
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battery were being charged and were therefore out of simultane-
ously.  Although the control operator notified that these batteries 
were to be taken out for service, he failed to recognize that they 
should not be taken out of service simultaneously. 
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13.2.2 Misinterpretation of communication, Definition:  
 
Response is based on wrong apprehension of information such as mis-
reading of text or instrument, misunderstanding of verbal message. 
 14
13.2.2 Misinterpretation of communication, Example: 
 
229. POWER LEVEL RAISED ABOVE CUTOFF PRIOR TO 
ESTABLISHING EQUILIBRIU, XENON 
Oconee 2 - Mar 75 - 80%. power 
The results of the 1320 calculation (March 22) were incor-
rectly interpreted in that they referenced 80% FP rather than 
100%  FP as required.  That is the time that xenon would be 
within spec limits was based upon 90% of the 80% FP equilib-
rium value rather thin upon 90% of the 100".  FP equilibrium 
value.  The extrapolated time that the core would reach 90% of 
the 80% FP equilibrium xenon value was 18:30, March 22, 
and the calculation was so marked. 
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13. 2. 3 Assumptions replace observation, Definition:  
 
Response is inappropriately based on information supplied by the operator 
(by recall, guesses, etc.) which does not correspond with information avail-
able from outside. 
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13. 2. 3 Assumptions replace observation, Examples: 
 
160. INSTRUMENT AIR NOT VALVED OUT OF CONTAINMENT 
Surry I - Jan 75 - cold shutdown 
In establishing the valve line ups, the operator assumed that all 
valve numbers beginning with the number "2" were associated 
with Unit 2. He did not realize there were 2 valves in series 
from Unit I station instrument air system to Unit I containment 
with 2 more valves from Unit 2 station instrument air system to 
Unit No. I containment. 
 
188. REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTEM IN0PERABLE 
DURING STARTUP - PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
Oconee 2 Jan 75 - heatup in progress 
The control operator assured that the review had been completed 
and no conditions existed which would prevent unit startup.  In 
both cases, the lack of complete, accurate communications was 
at cause. 
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13. 3. 1 Forgetting isolated act or function, Definition:  
 
Operator forgets to perform an isolated act or function, i.e., an act or func-
tion which is not cued by the functional context or is not having immediate 
effect upon the mental or motor sequence. 
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13.3.1 Forgettinq isolated act or function, Examples: 
 
91. OPERATOR MISSED PRO'EDLTRAL STEP - SI - PRESSURE 
LIMIT EXCEEDED  
Prairie Is. 1 - Jan 74 
The transient occurred while conducting the Safeguards Logic 
Train A monthly surveillance test.  A SI signal was initiated 
when a step which puts Train A in TEST was inadvertently 
missed.  Completion of the subsequent step initiated-SI an a 
simulated low steam line pressure signal and opened Number 11 
acumulator outlet valve. 
 
191 DIESEL NOT TESTED
Cook 1 - Feb 75 (power escalation testing - 30% power 
The failure of the operator to perform required surveillance on 
the standby DC when tagging a diesel for maintenance was the 
cause. CD DC should have been tested immediately after AB DG 
was removed from service and once every 8 hr thereafter per the 
Tech Specs. 
 
205. PROCESS VENT SYSTFM RADIATION MONITOR LEFT IN  
CALBRATE
Surry I - Apr 75 - LGO'7 power 
The Process Vent Gaseous Radiation monitor was found in the 
"Calibrate" mode.  It was found to have been that way for the 
previous 24 hr.  The monitor was placed in the calibrate mode to 
demonstrate its operation to a trainee. The monitor was then in-
advertently left in that position. This resulted in a failure to 
monitor the Process Vent System for radioactive gases for a 24 
hr period. 
 
211. MAINTENANCE LEFT FEEDWATER PUMP PACKING TOO 
TIGHT 
Oconee 3 - April 75 - 1oo%. power 
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Maintenance had been performed to repair a leaking packing 
gland prior to the failure.  The packing was apparently set too 
tight and the pump was returned to service without verifying op-
erability as is required by procedure. 
 
213. HPSI VALVE STOPS NOT RESTORED  
Maine Yankee - June 75 - shutdown 
Evidently the valve mechanical stop adjustments had not been 
Properly restored following routine maintenance. 
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13.3.2 Mistake among alternatives, Definition:  
Simple choice of wrong alternative, a category is correctly used but by 
wrong member, e.g., mistakes of up/down, left/right, A/B, open/closed, 
locked/unlocked. 
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13.3.2 Mistake among alternatives, Examples: 
 
71. CORE FLOOD VALVE BREAKERS LOCKED CLOSED  
Oconee I - Oct 73 
During preparations for startup it was discovered that the 
breakers to the motor operators on CF-I and -2, the core flood 
tank discharge valves, had been locked in the closed position.  
Tech Specs and operating procedures require that these break-
ers be locked in the open position and tagged to prevent inadver-
tent isolation of the core flood tanks when the RCS is > 500 psig. 
 
170 TECHNICIAN ERROR - WRONG TANK RELEASED 
Palisades - Dec 74 - cold shutdown 
The RRMC technician, when transposing the data to the batch 
card, wrote down the north tank instead of the south tank. 
 
186. PROCEDURAL SAMPLING AND VALVING DEFICIENCTES - 
RELEASE 
Cook 1   Feb 75 (power escalation testing) 
Immediately prior to the event the North WECT had been filled, 
recirculated and sampled in preparation for the release.  While 
waiting for the analytical results of the sample for the North 
WECT, it was isolated and the South WECT was filled and placed 
on recirculation.  The release permit for the North WECT was 
approved but the North WECT was not placed in the proper valve 
line up and the South WECT was released instead of the North 
WECT. 
 
239. LB SP.RAY OUT OF SERVICE  
Oconee July and Aug 
In the performance of the test, the Control Operator instructed 
the Utility Operator to open the breaker for valve lBS-2.  A Utility 
Operator's trainee inadvertently opened the Unit -1 breaker for 
valve 28S-2, thereby removing one train of RB spray from service 
on an operating unit. 
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186 and 239 could possibly belong to: Topographic, spatial orientation in-
adequate (13.5.2). 
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13.3.3 Other slips of memory, Definition:  
Erroneous recall of reference data values; names; need for actions, etc. 
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13-3.3 Other slips of-memory, Examples: 
 
151. RFACTOR TAKEN CRITICAL WITH BORATED STORAGE 
TANK LOW 
Rancho Seco  -  Oct 74 (subsequent to Initial criticality) 
The Shift Supervisor had thought that the Tech Spec minimum 
volume was 350,000 gal and had proceeded accordingly. 
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13.4 Inferences 
This group is covering problems of linear thought in causal nets. 
 26
13.4.1 Side effects or latent conditions not adequately considered, 
Definition: 
The man is in a less familiar situation characterized by knowledge-based, 
goal-controlled performance.  He performs erroneously during functional in-
ferences: The situation is not properly identified, the consequences of an 
event chain are not adequately predicted or an improper aim is chosen or la-
tent conditions are not adequately considered.  Consequently, the task or the 
intended goal is not fulfilled or adverse side effects occur or a combination of 
these consequences. 
 (Can be due to oversight, lack of knowledge etc., this is characterized by 
category 12: cause of human malfunction). 
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13.4.1 Side effects or latent conditions not adequately considered, Ex-
amples: 
193. OPERATOR ERROR - DIESEL BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE 
Ft. Calhoun I - Mar 75 - refueling shutdown 
DG 2 breaker IAD2 auto closed on bus lA4, however, DG breaker 
IAD1 failed to auto close on bus lA3.  The operator then manu-
ally closed breaker 1ADI by control switch. 
Breaker IAD1 did not and should not have auto closed onto bus 
IA3 in this instance.  In order to complete the auto close cir-
cuitry for IADI ill 4160 V motors connected to bus IA3 must be 
tripped so the DC is not subjected to the large starting currents 
of multiple induction motors connected to the bus.  In this case, 
low pressure SI pump SI-IA was in service providing shutdown 
cooling when the main transformer tripped.  SI-IA breaker does 
not trip on undervoltage when its control switch is in the close 
position.  If the operator had tripped SI-IA breaker, then the auto 
close circuitry for breaker 1AD1 would have been completed and 
IADI would have closed. 
 
246. EFFLUENT CHLORINE EXCESSIVE - HYPOCHLORITE 
FILLING HOSE DRAINED INTO STORM DRAIN  
Rancho Seco 1 - Apr -5 
A check of plant activities revealed that a tank truck had made a 
deliverY of hypochlorite to the Nuclear Service Raw Water Sys-
tem Hypochlorite Storage Tanks and there was no spill of hy-
pochlorite during the delivery.  However, after filling the last 
tank, the driver drained the hose to the storm drain  (4 gal). 
 
193 is an example of "latent conditions" and 246 of "Side effects", though 
discrimination between these two types is often difficult. 
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13.5 Physical coordination 
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13.5.1 Motor variability, Definition:  
Lack of manual precision, too big/small force applied, inappropriate tim-
ing.  Including deviations from "good craftsmanship". 
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13.5.1 Motor variability,  Examples: 
 
162. RELEASE OCCURRED WHILE DRAWING VACUUM IN SG's 
- PROCEDURAL PROBLEM 
Three Mi. Is. 1 - Nov 74 
While in the process of returning to power after an outage, an 
unplanned release occurred due to some improperly tightened 
valves in the vent line from the Reactor Coolant (RC) Drain Tank 
to the Steam Generators (SG). 
 
211. .MAINTENACE LEFT FEEDWATTER PU'MP PACKING TOO 
TIGHT
Oconee 3 - April 75 - 100% power 
Maintenance had been performed to repair a leaking packing 
gland prior to the failure.  The packing was apparently set too 
tight and the pump was returned to service without verifying op-
erability as is required by procedure. 
 
233. WIRE FELL ACROSS TERMINALS - INJECTION PUMP 
DAMAGED
Rancho Seco - July 74 (prior to initial fuel loading) 
The High Pressure Injection-Pump started inadvertently when a 
short strand of wire fell across terminals accidentally jumpering 
the. control switches in the control room. 
 
 31
13.5.2 Topographic.-spatial orientation inadequate, Definition:  
In spite of man's correct intention and his correct recall of identification 
marks, tagging etc., he unawaringly performs task/act in the wrong place or 
on the wrong object, because he is following his immediate sense of locality, 
this, however, not being applicable (not-updated, surviving imprints of old 
habits etc.). 
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13.5.2 Topographic, spatial orientation inadequate, Examples: 
 
52 IMPROPER GROUND PLACED FOR A TEST - LOSS OF 
OFFSITE POVER 
San Onofre I - June 73 
A few hours- later it was determined that the unit differential re-
lay operation was the result of the ground wire being inadver-
tently applied to the unit differential relay terminals located in 
the generator current transformer terminal box.9 
 
114 OPERATOR RELEASED WRONG TANK 
Oconee I - Apr 74 
The apparent cause was Operator error in opening the incorrect 
tank isolation valve.  The isolation valves for the 2 condensate 
test tanks are in close proximity and identified only by valve 
numbers.  During release from the 3 tank, the 2 monitors did 
not show an increase in count rate, verifying the safe activity 
level of the water being released. 
To prevent recurrence the condensate test tank isolation valves 
were to be more clearly identified to distinguish the A tank from 
the B tank. 
 
130. WRONG VALVE REPAIRED - BORIC ACID TANK OUT 
Oconee 1 - June 74 
On 2 different days maintenance personnel mistakenly disas-
sembled the Concentrated  Boric Acid Storage Tank (C BAST) 
supply valve and this resulted in the isolation of the CRAST for a 
total of 55 min. 
 
144. WRONG BREAKER OPENED - F-W PL'MP NOT AVAILABLE 
- LACK OF LOG ENTRIES
Prairie Is.  I - Aug 74 - 100% power 
The MCC for 22 AEVP is physically located near 12 AFWP.  The 
MCC for 12 AFWP is located considerably further away.  Some-
one, when maintenance was being performed and equipment be-
ing reinstalled on 22 AFVP, inadvertently opened the breaker for 
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12 AFWP Auxiliary lube oil pump.  This action prevented the 12 
AFWP from starting due to the lube oil pressure interlock. 
 
No definitive examples have been found, nevertheless it is expected, that 
the category 13.5.2 will prove to be legitimate, if more detailed event informa-
tion/analysis is provided. 
The given examples should be regarded as samples of the present descrip-
tive level of event reports, the malfunction mechanisms involved could be-
long to category 13.5.2, however, to other categories as well. 
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